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USSR Report

POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL AFFAIRS

(FOUO 23/80)



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INTERNATIONAL

GROMYKO ATTACKS U.S. POLICIES IN AFRICA

Moscow INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS in English No 10, Oct 80 pp 21-28

[Article by Prof Anatoly Gromyko]

[Excerpts]

The crumbling of the colonial system has become a major factor behind the general crisis of capitalism at its present stage. In the late 1940s and 1950s, the majority of countries of Asia and some countries of Africa cast off the fetters of colonial dependence. There were nine independent states in Africa at the end of the 1950s, and then during 1960 alone, which went down in history as the Year of Africa, their number grew to 26. That year the United Nations adopted, on the Soviet Union's initiative, a Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, which played a key role in stimulating the national liberation movement. In the 1970s, when the peoples of Guinea-Bissau, Cape Verde Islands, Mozambique and Angola won their independence after a victorious struggle, the last African colonial empire—that of Portugal—ceased to exist. "In the first half of the seventies," read the Report to the 25th CPSU Congress, "that continent saw the concluding phase of the downfall of the colonial system."¹ In 1980, a new independent state—Zimbabwe—appeared on the map of Africa. Thus, Africa now counts 50 independent states, exclusive of the racist Republic of South Africa, which the peoples of Africa do not recognise as a sovereign state. Important political and socio-economic changes have been taking place in many of the newly-free African states.

Having won political independence, the peoples of Africa realised that sovereignty itself does not free them in full measure and remains problematic in many respects, for they are unable to raise their material and cultural level dramatically and score a break-through in the social sphere unless they rid themselves of economic dependence on the West. This is why many young states have been experiencing a mounting struggle for economic independence and social emancipation.

The liberation struggle for economic independence at present follows two courses: one against the economic and cultural backwardness inherited from the colonial past, and the other against the intrigues by the imperialist powers seeking to hold back the rise of the economy of the African countries to independence and to enfeeble the movement for a radical restructuring of economic relations with the West.

Though the African countries have undoubtedly scored successes in economic construction over the past two decades, their economic situation

¹ Documents and Resolutions. 25th Congress of the CPSU, Moscow, 1976, p. 19.

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continues to be difficult. Suffice it to say that out of 31 states that the United Nations has listed as the world's least developed countries 20 are found in Africa.

The continuing imperialist plunder is the main reason for the difficulties confronting the countries of this continent. Imperialism is unwilling to retreat without offering a battle: it hopes to retain and even expand its "presence" on the continent by meddling in the domestic affairs of independent countries as well.

Many developed capitalist states have immediate political and economic interests in Africa, which are determined, first, by the fact that it has valuable resources of minerals and raw materials and a cheap work-force and, second, by the continent's important strategic position. Having been deprived of direct ownership of raw materials, the foreign monopolies strive to maintain indirect control over them.

At present the United States is the mainstay of neo-colonialism in Africa. Washington is spearheading its efforts at dimming the flame of the liberation struggle on the continent, directing it into the channel of bourgeois reformism and ridding it of its anti-imperialist content. At the same time, it aims to split the unity of the African countries, turning some of them into strongholds of US imperialism. This tactics is dovetailed with efforts to halt detente which largely blocks the imperialist attempts to impede the revolutionary transformations in Africa by resorting to arms.

The tactical subterfuges that US politicians resort to in Africa differ depending on the degree of the US monopolies' interest in the exploitation of its natural wealth, and the military strategic importance of a particular country. To hold the continent under the capitalist umbrella and to maintain conditions for continuing the neo-colonialist exploitation and expanding its military presence in Africa has always been the strategic goals of this policy.

ECONOMIC FACTORS

The policy that US imperialists pursue in Africa is determined, first and foremost, by a desire to seize the raw material resources which become increasingly vital for the United States with the worsening energy and raw material crises.

In recent years, the US Congress has repeatedly expressed concern over the so-called US dependence on foreign supply sources. This concern has particularly often been voiced in regard to oil. Here US strategists make far-reaching and dangerous—especially for the Africans—conclusions to the effect that the significance of Africa as a treasure-house of raw materials for US monopolies and especially for the needs of the military-industrial complex as well as for NATO is steadily rising.

It is a fact of life that in recent years US ruling circles have noticeably intensified their "economic offensive" against the countries of Africa, regarding the whole continent, primarily, as a source of fuel and raw materials and also as an area of investments for them and an extensive market for US goods.

The United States makes active use of its economic links to bolster its positions on the continent. Washington clearly stakes on the premise that the African countries' growing dependence on the United States enables the latter to influence the foreign policies of these countries. This is why the US monopolies seek to increase their investments in Africa.

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On the whole, the African countries do not figure among the US' major economic partners. They account for only 3 per cent of America's overseas investments. The significance of Africa in the US foreign economic ties, however, continuously grows, and not infrequently to the detriment of the West European interests. Continuing to develop all-round cooperation with the racist regime in South Africa and to drain the mineral raw materials vital to the USA from southern Africa, the administration and the US-based transnational corporations simultaneously establish extensive relations with the other African countries, particularly those where rich mineral deposits have been discovered.

Nigeria occupies a special place in the economic and political schemes designed by the US ruling circles in relation to Africa. The largest state on the continent, it ranks first among the US trading partners in Africa, second, after South Africa, in the volume of US investments and among the oil-suppliers to the US market.

The US government focusses considerable attention on the question of granting economic and military aid to African countries, viewing it as an important instrument for consolidating on the whole the positions of US imperialists on the continent, bringing political pressure to bear on the independent states of Africa, and ensuring them continuous access to the continent's mineral and fuel resources. With these goals in mind, the Carter Administration decided to raise the economic and technical aid to the African countries from \$417.3 million in 1977 to \$516.7 million in 1979. Whereas in 1980 this aid rose to \$707.1 million, the expenses requested by the US administration for these purposes in 1981 will reach \$787 million.

The total outlays requested by the US administration for the economic and military aid to the African countries in the 1980 fiscal year will reach \$652 million against \$530.7 million appropriated by the US Congress in the previous fiscal year. The growth is accounted, above all, for greater expenses on the maintenance of "security" and provision of military aid.

STRATEGIC GOALS AND TACTICAL MOVES

The development of the revolutionary process on the continent, the emergence and strengthening of the socialist-oriented countries, the consolidation of the positions of the states with a clear-cut anti-imperialist programme within the OAU framework and, lastly, the mounting armed struggle of the peoples of southern Africa for their independence are forcing US diplomacy to resort to manoeuvres more and more frequently. To achieve their neo-colonialist goals the United States and the other imperialist powers tend to pass themselves off as disinterested friends of the African peoples.

The core of the new American policy in Africa has become the abandonment of the unilateral orientation towards the racist regimes (although with continued backing for them) and the considerable intensification of relations with the capitalist-oriented countries. Here a special emphasis is made on the development of relations with Nigeria, which, as was said earlier, is given the role of a major oil supplier for the United States in the next decade, which was reaffirmed during Vice-President Mondale's visit to the country in July 1980.

It would seem that the "Vietnam syndrome" would for a long time continue to restrain the US politicians and the military from new ventures in the developing countries. Indeed, under the conditions of international

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detents of the 1970s, Washington and the capitals of other NATO countries vigorously advocated the concept of "interdependence" between the West and the developing countries. For instance, President Carter put relationships with the developing world next to the relationships with the NATO partners and Japan. In this way the US administration tried to create the impression that a "new" era had set in, which is "favourable" for the developing countries in their relations with the United States. At that time Western propaganda insisted on the alleged existence of a community of interests between the newly-independent countries and the imperialist powers, on the possibility for them to develop relations in many areas.

But then there was the NATO intervention in Zaire under the political and military guidance of Washington, and, following the collapse of Portugal's colonial empire and especially the events in Angola, the US government stepped up its diplomatic, political and ideological activity in African states on an unprecedented scale in an effort to bolster up its battered prestige and weaken the growing influence of the USSR and the other socialist countries in Africa. In July 1977, President Carter said that he was inclined to "aggressively challenge... the Soviet Union" in Africa and other regions of the world.

The events of 1977-1978 in Zaire, which had nothing to do with the assertions by Washington's high-ranking officials about the Soviet and Cuban involvement, consisted of a popular action against the existing regime. US government circles, however, used them as a pretext for a demonstration of force and for intimidating the African peoples. This recurrence of the case of "crisis diplomacy" was needed by Washington to give battle to an independent Africa rather than to the USSR or Cuba as Carter and Brzezinski tried to convince the world.

Owing to the resolute rebuff that the majority of the African countries, supported by the socialist community and all peace-loving forces, rendered to the recurrence of the "crisis diplomacy", the US ruling circles were forced to depart from the policy designed for the period of the events in Shaba, and the leading statesmen in the Washington administration had to tone down their pronouncements.

At the present stage, US diplomacy prefers to combine a policy of flirtation with the Africans and of noisy propaganda campaigns "condemning" racism with the policy aimed at splitting the national liberation movements, invariably supporting South Africa and continuing the imperialist exploitation of the African peoples.

US ruling circles regard South Africa as an important element in the NATO strategy and nurture plans for creating a South Atlantic Treaty Organisation (SATO), modelled after NATO, to comprise Argentina, Brazil and the Republic of South Africa. With US imperialists' active assistance South Africa has built up a powerful military-industrial complex, launched the production of many types of conventional weapons and approached the stage of developing nuclear weapons. Whereas in the past the spokesmen for the present US administration sometimes levelled strong criticism at the racist regime of South Africa, going out of their way to pose as the opponents of apartheid in the eyes of the Africans, they are now orchestrating quite a different tune. Washington has been withholding its criticism of Pretoria of late, while sentiment in favour of further rapprochement with South Africa has been running strong in the Pentagon and the US Congress.

The US administration's course vis-à-vis southern Africa has been directed at making the South African government mitigate somewhat the severity of apartheid and find a "peaceful solution" to the problems

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of the south of Africa, which would virtually ensure capitalism's safe development in this region and consequently safeguard the positions and interests of the United States and its imperialist allies.

The role that South Africa and its military bases play in the Pentagon's plans has increased in connection with the establishment of the so-called "rapid reaction corps" designed for carrying out the gendarme missions in respect to the revolutionary and the national liberation movements of the peoples of Africa and the Middle East. In November 1979, a delegation of the House Armed Service Committee visited military bases in South Africa, including the naval base in Simonstown. The Committee's Chairman Melvin Price, said during the visit that South Africa is vital to US strategic interests. "Otherwise we wouldn't be here," the Congressman stressed. "Our visit is because of our interest in defense matters."³

Worthy of attention is the report, published in Washington, on the hearings in the Subcommittee on Africa of the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee. The report is hinged on the argument surrounding the military-strategic importance of the South African regime for the West. Moreover, it could not but refer to the "Soviet threat" myth. All this reasoning means that the compilers of the report are trying to convince the American public that the United States depends more on South Africa than the other way round. Hence the conclusion that the United States should not "irritate" the South African regime; on the contrary, it should take the appropriate steps to "gain its favour". This is how the interests of the peoples of Africa, who are fighting for the elimination of the last seats of apartheid and racism on the continent, are sacrificed to the military strategic and economic interests of the imperialist power. The essence of US policy is support for South Africa so as to maintain it as a "bastion of anti-communism".

The Carter Government went to all lengths to implement the neo-colonialist Anglo-American plan with regard to Rhodesia. Its idea boiled down to introducing "face-lifting" reforms in this country with the racist minority staying in power. Its eventual failure, however, as a result of the resolute stand taken by the patriotic forces of Zimbabwe and the "front-line" states and supported by all African countries, compelled Washington and London to start manoeuvring and making concessions. The United States showed particular zeal in trying to help Britain to secure a neo-colonialist solution to the Rhodesian problem at the London Conference in late 1979. The US Air Force took part in the airlifting of the British truce supervision force to Salisbury. The Carter Administration unilaterally decided to lift the economic sanctions against Rhodesia, which had been imposed by the UN Security Council, prior to the conclusion of the negotiations in London. The victory of the Zimbabwe Patriotic Front in the elections was a serious blow at the neo-colonialist designs engineered by Washington and London.

As for Namibia, the US government, as a member of the Contact Group of five countries—the United States, Britain, France, the FRG and Canada—is pushing the Western plan for a neo-colonialist "settlement" of the Namibian problem. Moreover, everything is being done to create the illusion of active negotiations concerning Namibia in order to deny the UN Security Council an opportunity to decide upon the sanctions against South Africa.

The United States has heightened its interest of late in the work of the Organisation of African Unity. The US government is aware that

³ *Foreign Affairs*, No. 3, Vol. 58, 1980, p. 648.

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the OAU to a certain extent determines the positions of the African countries regarding the pressing problems of today both in the United Nations and the non-aligned movement. Washington takes into account the fact that the African states are playing an increasingly prominent role in international relations and make up the largest regional group of the developing countries. The OAU is now a factor that the US administration has to reckon with in shaping and pursuing its African policy.

At the same time, the Carter Administration is not averse to using the reactionary pro-Western circles in the African states proper in order to water down the anti-imperialist stance of the OAU, to distort the substance of the policy pursued by the Soviet Union and the other socialist community countries in Africa, to undermine the friendship between the African countries and the USSR. The Carter Administration is doing its best to neutralise the influence of the socialist and anti-imperialist-oriented countries, especially, Algeria, Ethiopia, Angola, Mozambique and Libya, in the OAU.

The events of the last two years attest to the fact that a tendency for active and direct US involvement in Africa's affairs with an eye to ensuring imperialist interests on the continent and in the Indian Ocean now prevails in Washington.

Thus, on October 2, 1979, Carter announced his decision to supply arms to Morocco for the fight against the POLISARIO front in the Western Sahara. The US administration insisted on obtaining naval and air force bases in Kenya and Somalia. With this aim in view the Pentagon and the US Department of State dispatched a special mission in mid-December 1979 to Kenya and Somalia and also to some other countries to discuss the possibility of the US police "rapid reaction corps" using their bases. According to the press, the US government has entered the negotiations on the possible use of the French military base in Djibouti.⁴ The United States still persists in not recognising the People's Republic of Angola. The Senate has recently sanctioned the execution of "covert and overt" hostile acts against Angola.

The danger of imperialist armed intervention in the internal affairs of the African countries is still alive. In the opinion of US governing circles there are more than enough "pretexts" for intervention in the south of the continent and also in other conflict areas. Under these conditions only the stronger unity of the African states, their friendship and all-round cooperation with the socialist community can become a reliable safeguard against the recurrence of the "crisis diplomacy" being cultivated by the aggressive forces of imperialism.

⁴ See *Foreign Affairs*, No. 3, Vol. 58, 1980, pp. 656-657.

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USA: INTELLIGENCE AND FOREIGN POLICY

Moscow SSHA: INFORMATSIYA I VNESHNYAYA POLITIKA (USA: Intelligence and Foreign Policy) in Russian 1979 signed to press 7 Mar 79 pp 213-224

[Annotation and excerpt from book by Radomir Georgiyevich Bogdanov and Andrey Afanas'yevich Kokoshin, Nauka, 4550 copies]

[Text] The present monograph examines the role of intelligence in the elaboration and making of foreign policy decisions in the United States. A critical analysis is given of the features of intelligence practice in the State Department and other U.S. foreign policy departments, the types and forms of intelligence circulating in the state machinery and its role in foreign policy activities.

2. Types and Forms of Information Products Circulating
In the U.S. Foreign Policy System

[Excerpt] Analysis of the forms of intelligence products for the needs of foreign policy prepared within the "intelligence community" is of definite interest. In American practice two basic types of foreign policy intelligence are distinguished: "finished" and "raw." Information which has undergone analysis and been compared with other intelligence is placed in the "finished" category. "Raw" intelligence has not been evaluated or compared with other information. From this viewpoint intelligence from U.S. foreign representatives is "raw," but most of it is of value in preparing "finished" intelligence.

The "intelligence community" prepares three categories of "finished" intelligence: synopses of current events, basic or encyclopedic digests and forecasts. Some American specialists feel that one of the basic shortcomings of "finished" intelligence is the excessively long list of documents of this type circulating in the administration. For the departments of the administration where foreign policy decisions are made, the "Report on the Results of Observation of Conditions"⁷ is issued. This report is prepared by the Council's interdepartmental committee, the functions of which include observation of the possibility of armed conflict arising in any part of the globe, especially conflict threatening the security of the United States or its allies. There are also no fewer than 10 official

7. See: Marchetti, V., and Marks, D., "The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence," New York, 1974, pp 97-100.

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synopses of events. The CIA Department of Current Intelligence issues three separate documents of this type. The most important of them is known as the President's Intelligence Checklist. This document contains approximately 10 pages and simply lists the events of the past day, dealing in greater detail with the questions which are of interest to the president at present. The document is delivered to the White House in the early morning, and during the president's trips it is transmitted to him via equipment. The content of the document is not submitted to the members of the "intelligence community" for approval, but usually it presents their general viewpoint.⁸

The CIA also prepares the "Central Intelligence Bulletin," which is delivered to the White House and all Cabinet members every morning. Lower level officials who need foreign policy intelligence because of the nature of their work receive copies of the bulletin. It usually contains from 15 to 20 pages and is supplied with the necessary graphs and maps. This bulletin only includes major topics, but the material is considerably more extensive than in the President's Intelligence Checklist. The content of the bulletin is submitted in its entirety to a special "intelligence community" committee for approval. Members of it who do not agree with the interpretation of particular events may add their personal opinion to the bulletin. The bulletin is also sent to American representatives abroad in order to familiarize them with the official viewpoint on different international events.

Along with the top secret bulletin the CIA publishes a secret bulletin intended for officials without clearance for top secret materials. It is also distributed to U.S. foreign representatives, and it basically duplicates the top secret bulletin with certain deletions.

Current intelligence originating from the military department is provided by the Defense Intelligence Agency [DIA]. It issues three daily reports. One of them is the Intelligence Bulletin. The top secret version of the Central Intelligence Bulletin differs from it chiefly in its more detailed coverage of events. The DIA Intelligence Bulletin is issued on 30-40 pages as a rule, and it touches on a much wider range of events than the CIA top secret bulletins; it is intended for the information of the secretary of defense and his closest associates and for the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It includes military intelligence which touches on the foreign policy interests of the United States. The bulletins are also distributed to all American military staffs and military attaches abroad as an official daily briefing from Washington.

The intelligence agency also issues a secret version of the daily top secret bulletin. It is known as the Intelligence Bulletin, which is circulated in Washington and distributed to the major U.S. armed forces abroad and to all American

8. Here and infra, see: "The Intelligence Community," New York, 1977; Morrison, J., "Kissinger: Uncertain Greatness," New York, 1977; McGarney, P., "CIA. The Myth and the Madness," New York, 1972; Marketty, V., and Marks, D., "CIA: The Cult of Intelligence," New York, 1974.

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military attaches and which, like the CIA secret report, is in content an adapted version of top secret information.

The third type of daily report issued by the DIA is the so-called OP-INT (operative intelligence). Material of an operative and intelligence nature intended for the secretary of defense, his closest associates and the Joint Chiefs of Staff is presented in generalized form on 10 or more pages. A document of this type was first issued at the very beginning of the war in Vietnam and since then has come to cover conditions throughout the world. The necessity of this type of report is determined by the following considerations: American military operations often provoke retaliatory action by the other country without receiving a complete interpretation from the "intelligence community." Thus certain representatives of the administration do not always know about the nature and purpose of American military operations.

In addition to numerous daily detailed reports issued by the National Security Agency for the information of members of the "intelligence community" the agency prepares a Daily Intelligence Bulletin which covers basic information received the day before via equipment and which draws conclusions which are not formulated in professional language in order to be understood in foreign policy circles not associated with the "intelligence community." In addition, the agency issues daily regional bulletins which cover the course of events in specific regions of the globe. The bulletins are intended for use in the regional offices of the State Department and in the International Security Agency of the Defense Department. Such questions as, for example, the training of the Soviet Army, Navy and troops in anti-aircraft defense receive detailed coverage in the bulletin.

The Pentagon's National Indications Center, which heads a broad network of different notification and indication centers, also issues daily reports for the "intelligence community" and government circles which make decisions concerning foreign policy questions. The center processes all "raw" materials incoming in 24 hours and selects from 80 to 100 of the most important communications. Excerpts or complete texts are distributed in Washington in the form of a 35-50 page daily report which is called the Report of the NIC Officer on Duty.

The State Department issues daily top secret material--the Diplomatic Bulletin, which contains information with a direct relationship to foreign policy. This bulletin is distributed by telegraph to diplomatic representatives abroad and to the departments in Washington.

The Foreign Broadcast Information Service issues daily summaries of full texts of the most important broadcasts in the last 24 hours. They are widely used in government and academic circles.

The above mentioned documents comprise the basis for the "intelligence community's" work in providing the government with foreign policy intelligence but do not completely cover the entire range of the "community's" information activities. For example, so-called "coaching"--official briefings conducted by the secretary of defense for different government circles--is widespread in Washington. Every morning for 15-30 minutes several officials of the department orally brief

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congressional committees and subcommittees, the work groups of the National Security Council and the Defense Department leadership.

Second in activity in this field is the State Department's Intelligence and Research Agency, which every morning briefs the secretary of state at a meeting and his colleagues on the National Security Council. The State Department and Defense Department briefings are accompanied by demonstrations of visual aids, slides and in some instances, films. In terms of the effect they produce, they may be compared with the evening news of the American broadcasting companies NBC, CBS and ABC.

Every day official Washington is swamped with versions of daily intelligence bulletins sent by telegraph and prepared by the numerous armed forces abroad.

Current intelligence materials are not limited to daily reports. The CIA issues a top secret version of TIME Magazine weekly. The events which took place in every region of the world during the past week are described in great detail in 35-40 pages. The publication is supplied with photographs, maps, diagrams, etc. A secret version of the weekly is published for persons without clearance for top secret material. This publication is circulated in Washington and distributed abroad to all CIA services and American embassies and to all American military staffs abroad.

The National Security Agency prepares a weekly report which covers information received from around the world through intelligence channels by means of communication in a wider context than in the daily reports. Weekly reports on specific regions are also issued; they are distributed to all institutions in Washington which deal with intelligence materials by means of communication. Copies of these documents are transmitted by telegraph to the NSA, all embassies and the American armed forces.

The Foreign Broadcast Information Service issues a weekly digest of the content and nature of socialist country broadcasts. It is circulated in government circles and distributed to the libraries of individual colleges.

The Air Force intelligence service makes a film available weekly to all interested officials. As a rule it runs about 45 minutes. Such films for official use depict the activities of the American air force in different parts of the globe.

Furthermore, information of government circles is achieved using so-called "facts for consideration." They are issued occasionally by departments which are part of the "intelligence community." As a rule once a week one or two such reports appear from each department. Devoted to detailed analysis of current problems, they present an in-depth study of the question in its historical aspect. The topics of the reports are varied. There are several ways of distributing these special materials. By order of the State Department this material can be sent only to the secretary of state and White House officials; through the Defense Department, to all U.S. armed forces; through the CIA this material can go to the members of the NSA. There is no established channel for distributing these materials, but they play a substantial role in the process of foreign policy decision making,

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as they are a departure from everyday routine and an attempt to present current events in a broad context.

The Foreign Broadcast Information Service issues a widely used summary called the "Summary of International Responses." The United States' every step in the field of foreign policy is evaluated from the viewpoint of the reaction which it produces in the press and radio of the entire world.

The need for so-called "basic" intelligence information was most acutely realized at the time of the invasion of Tarawa during the Second World War. Because of incorrect information on tides the troops were landed on coral reefs 1500 yards offshore, an error which resulted in the deaths of many American soldiers. So that such a thing would never happen again, the CIA was entrusted with the task of ensuring the collection of "basic" information. One of the departments entrusted with this function was the Department for Contacts which initially engaged in the collection of objects, such as tourist road maps, which are trivial at first glance. The activity of the department received further development when the State Department selected special officials for the post of geographical coordinators whose job included photographing of roads, bridges, coastal zones, telegraph poles, power plants, urban and rural houses and samples of police and military uniforms throughout the world. All this information is collected at the CIA, where a dossier of photographs for each country of the world is kept in the Central Reference Department.

One result of the work in collecting "basic" information is the National Intelligence Survey--a six-part encyclopedia about all countries of the world. The information collected in this publication gives basic facts about the country, beginning with the topography of the region with emphasis on analysis of geographical objects of military significance: shores and beachheads, macadam roads and railroads, ports and harbors, climatic conditions, and ending with basic information on the economic system of the country, the demographic composition of the population, politics and government, urban and rural ways of life, armed forces, the public health and medicine organs and the security service.

An increasingly important field of information activity is the field of economics. Practically each of the member departments of the "intelligence community" prepares a quarterly, semi-annual and annual report on such subjects as foreign aid to other countries and trade, industry, agriculture, transport and communications in a specific country. During the fiercest bombing of North Vietnam the DIA prepared a monthly report called "Estimate of Damage Inflicted by Bombing," in which data on the number of trucks, bridges, barges and trains destroyed or damaged were correlated with data on the resources remaining at the country's command and an attempt was made to evaluate the result of the previous 30 days' bombing.

Under the influence of the events of the energy crisis and the general economic crisis of 1974-1975 which struck the capitalist economic system, such questions as the provision of fuel and energy resources and the status of energetics as a whole in different countries of the world, analysis of possible ways to expand American exports and foreign investments, the status and outlook for the development of the international exchange and finance system, etc., have played a much more important role in the preparation of information and

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analytical documents of the intelligence service and other subdivisions of the U.S. foreign policy mechanism. In connection with this the CIA, for example, has for the past two years issued among its special materials and reports a weekly summary of events in the field of oil extraction, transporting and trade on a global scale. The given topic is also the subject of continuing studies by a number of subdivisions of the State Department, the information and analysis service of the Department of Energy created in 1977 and by the appropriate offices of the Treasury Department.

Despite the growing attention of the information and analysis subdivisions of the foreign policy departments to political economic problems, it is apparently still lagging behind the traditionally predominant attention to military and political problems. At the same time it is clear to specialists that problems exist in the field of economic intelligence that must be surmounted in order to ensure the political leaders of adequate information appropriate to the present level of foreign policy significance of new and old economic problems. Today military intelligence requires enormous outlays on a system for obtaining and initially processing information while most of the economic data necessary for making political decisions is not secret. In the opinion of the Murphy Commission experts the problem is, rather, competent scientific, analytical treatment of large files of economic information. And in order to solve this problem it is not enough to strengthen only the CIA's capabilities in this field. This commission feels that this is precisely where it is acceptable and even necessary to have duplication in the analysis of complex economic problems, which will be justified even with regard to the cost of this analysis. Consequently it is suggested that not only should the analytical resources of the intelligence service for processing economic information be strengthened but the results of the appropriate intelligence and analytic work of the subdivisions of the State Department, Treasury Department, the Departments of Commerce and Agriculture and the President's Council of Economic Advisers should also be used more actively.

The field of science is still another important field of research in which the CIA, DIA, NSA and, recently to an increasingly greater degree, the State Department take an active part, in the process duplicating each other to a significant extent. They regularly publish technical descriptions and evaluations of all weapon systems, major and minor, and issue monthly, semi-annual and annual reports on the Soviet and Chinese programs for development of rocket and space technology, on the production of airplanes in Israel, the electronics industry in Japan and its space research and on other questions of scientific and technical development. These basic materials are distributed within the "intelligence community" as "basic" information for analysts. Moreover, and this is very important, they go to the military planning organs which must be well informed on events taking place in the socialist countries.

Study of the personalities of the top-level leaders of other countries is a traditionally important aspect of the activity of the intelligence service. The DIA and CIA keep extensive dossiers on political, public and military figures. These dossiers contain not only biographical information but also all possible information on the views and positions of a particular leader reflected in his written or oral statements or other sources. The DIA regularly issues a

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Collection of Biographies of the Officers of Foreign Armies, and the CIA prepares materials on the political and public figures. This type of information becomes necessary when a sudden change of government occurs and it is necessary to determine the possible directions of the new leadership's activities.

The distribution of the armed forces of countries which are potential enemies is a part of "basic" intelligence material. The military specialists who work on planning are constantly updating their plans and thus require daily and weekly reports on changes in the distribution of the forces of possible enemies of the United States. The CIA, DIA and NSA and also the staff of the four branches of the service prepare daily, weekly, monthly and quarterly reports intended for the military planning organs of the United States.

An important aspect of most of the analytical materials produced by the "intelligence community" is analytical forecasting of events. As a rule the research begins with an inquiry from the president or one of his closest assistants to the "intelligence community." For example, the question may be one like this: "In what direction will the foreign policy of Communist China develop after certain events?" The inquiry initially goes to the Board of National Estimates--a group of the 12 highest officials in the intelligence apparatus, former ambassadors and military. The Council defines the wording of the problem more exactly, divides it into feasible components and then sends them to the appropriate intelligence departments. During the first stage of work the basic points of the future material are outlined. Then each department prepares its part and sends it to a CIA department, the Office of National Estimates, for preparation of the first version. When the rough draft is ready it is distributed to all members of the "community," the experts of which get together at work sessions to eliminate all discrepancies from the rough draft. As a rule three or four sessions are required to achieve preliminary agreement on the working level.

When a member of the Council who is not directly responsible for this problem verifies that all departments have had an opportunity to express an opinion on the rough draft, he presents a new version for examination by the U.S. Intelligence Board. This board, which consists of representatives of all the intelligence departments of Washington is like a board of "community" directors. As a rule, the report presented for their scrutiny still contains a number of discrepancies and objections by different departments. The board members attempt to resolve all contradictions in order to present a collective report to the president and the NSA, but they are by no means obliged to achieve complete agreement on all aspects of the question under discussion. As a rule, however, during the final stage they succeed in achieving a certain compromise in the analysis.

An estimate produced on special inquiry is known as a "Special National Intelligence Estimate." It is a version of the "National Intelligence Estimate," which is prepared regularly. Comprehensive analysis of the military strength and intentions of the Soviet Union is performed annually. Continuous observation of specific countries is conducted with the aim of presenting the military circles which develop strategic plans with a complete description of the basic trends in the country's domestic and foreign policy, the stability of its government and the possibility of changes.

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In reference to the events of the period of the outbreak of the Arab-Israeli conflict in 1973, R. Cline, former deputy director of the CIA and the State Department Intelligence and Research Office, names a number of basic components of the "National Intelligence Estimate," intended for use at the NSA level: analysis and forecasting of the possible actions by the USSR under conditions of intensification of the conflict, the probability of different versions of the development of this conflict directly between Israel and the Arab countries and the consequences of specific actions by the United States as applied to the two above mentioned components of the problem.¹⁰

In this case one of the principal results of analysis of the information is forecasting, which is not performed solely in the highest circles of the "intelligence community." For example, the Defense Department, which continuously strives to have information on the capabilities and intentions of prospective enemies, has developed its own system which differs from the above described procedure and which makes it possible to perform studies in the field of armaments in the usual way. The units of the Joint Staff which handle planning problems have reached agreement with the DIA on regularly issuing the so-called "Joint Intelligence Planning Estimate."

The DIA and the intelligence services of the branches of the service jointly develop forecasts of the enemy's capabilities in the field of armaments without enlisting other members of the "intelligence community" in this work. This results in a significant savings of time, eliminates discrepancies and makes it possible to circulate forecasts on different types of armaments. This has serious consequences, since such a procedure enables the Defense Department to continue to improve arms without needing analysis of the DIA forecasts by the intelligence departments without a direct interest in the given question.

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10. Cline, R., "Policy Without Intelligence," FOREIGN POLICY, No 17, Winter 1974-1975, p 129.

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INTERNATIONAL

SOCIOECONOMIC PROBLEMS OF DISARMAMENT

Moscow SOTSIAL'NO-EKONOMICHESKIYE PROBLEMY RAZORUZHENIYA; SBORNIK STATEY (Socio-economic Problems of Disarmament; Collection of Articles) in Russian 1978 signed to press 31 Oct 80 pp 1-11

[Table of contents, and introduction of booklet by the Soviet Committee to Defend the Peace, prepared for press by the Scientific Commission for Disarmament, Soviet Committee to Defend the Peace, 1100 copies, 11 pages]

[Excerpts]

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Introduction

One of the most dangerous and most persistent myths of our time which have been artificially created by advocates of the military-industrial complexes in the West for the purpose of justifying the arms race that they are conducting is the myth concerning the impossibility of economic prosperity in the industrially developed states without a tremendous and constantly growing military budget. In addition to a noisy propaganda campaign intended to frighten broad segments of the population

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with the nonexistent "military threat" from the Soviet Union and the other socialist states, this myth is being actively used by the gigantic propaganda machine of the opponents of detente and disarmament, as a means of exerting ideological pressure in order to disorient the masses of the people and deaden their vigilance and actions in the fight to end the arms race, limit and reduce the number of arms, and the fight for universal and complete disarmament.

In this regard the attention of the peace-loving public, the role of which in the fight for the consolidation of detente is becoming more effective with every passing year, is being attracted more and more frequently by the problems that are linked with the economic and social consequences of disarmament. They, in particular, occupy an important place in the widely extended dialogue dealing with problems of detente and disarmament, which was begun in October 1973 at the World Congress of Peace-Loving Forces in Moscow and which, to this day, is continuing with the participation of representatives of various political parties, trade unions, and mass public movements that are cooperating in the system of the forum that was created by them -- the International Forum for Relations Among Peace-Loving Forces. The most thorough and most complete discussion of these problems occurred at the World Conference "In Favor of the Cessation of the Arms Race, Disarmament, and Detente," which was held in Helsinki on 23-26 September 1976. They were brought up for discussion at the international seminar "Alternatives to the Production of Arms," which was convoked by the International Forum for Relations Among Peace-Loving Forces in London, with the cooperation of the British Congress of Trade Unions and other public organizations in Great Britain. A special scientific symposium prepared by the International Peace Institute in Vienna in 1979 is devoted to them.

By way of preparation for these meetings, a group of Soviet scientists participating in the activities of the Scientific Commission on Problems of Disarmament, attached to the Soviet Committee to Defend the Peace, made an attempt to generalize and systematize certain ideas relative to the conversion of military production to peacetime purposes, as the contribution by the representatives of Soviet scientific public opinion to the discussion of this important scientific problem.

In submitting this collection of articles to the readers, the authors make absolutely no claims concerning the exhaustive exposition of the problem that has been posed. They are completely aware of the hypothetical nature of the very posing of this problem under conditions of the continuing arms race. But, at the same time, they are profoundly convinced of the necessity of extending on a broad scale the scientific research and the search for the most efficient and most effective ways and methods of converting military production to civilian needs. This research, active dissemination, and discussion of their results at various levels, in international and national organizations will undoubtedly make it possible, in the final analysis, to refute and unmask in worldwide public opinion the fictitious statements by the apologists of militarism concerning the "technical impossibility" of disarmament.

It should be taken into consideration that as of the present day, in worldwide scientific literature on this group of problems, there is a numerical predominance of works by authors who, carrying out the social mandate of the military monopolies, graphically portray the imaginary and real difficulties of conversion, intimidate the reader with the catastrophic consequences of disarmament, etc. Major corporations do not spare their funds to publish and disseminate such pseudoscientific literature. However, there exist other research studies, which are for the time being obviously in insufficient quantity but which contain a

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convincing and scientific refutation of the assertions by the apologists of the arms race. Objective researchers, completely aware of the vital importance of the problem of disarmament, indicate the economic and political means with the aid of which it is possible and necessary to achieve a change in priorities, the sharp reduction in military expenditures, the efficient use of the gigantic industrial, scientific, and human potential that is currently engaged in the production of tools of death, and to strive for the welfare of mankind as a whole. These researchers, in our opinion, deserve the most active support and encouragement on the part of the broad public and primarily on the part of the organizations and movements participating in the fight for disarmament.

When considering certain concepts espoused by foreign scientists with regard to this group of problems and when expounding their own views and evaluations, the authors proceeded from the close interrelationship and interdependence between the capabilities and the prospects for conversion with the development and deepening of the process of detente. If conversion itself is possible only under conditions of real progress and the confirmation of detente and the supplementing of it by measures of military detente, then both the development of the processes of detente, its materialization, unambiguously presuppose, in their turn, conversion, the shifting of the labor and material resources of the states from the military sphere to the civilian.

In undertaking this research, the authors were guided by the firm conviction that no difficulties or problems arising as a result of conversion, no possible socioeconomic costs, can be compared in their scope with that real loss that is inflicted by the continuing arms race, with that lethal danger that it brings to mankind. Consequently, objectively speaking, the cessation of the arms race, the conversion of the military machine to purpose civilian purposes, constitutes a vital imperative, since in our time there simply is no intelligent alternative to detente and disarmament.

An analysis of various aspects of this problem confirms the conclusion to which many objective scientists and political and public figures in various countries are coming, namely: the technical problems of conversion are no more complicated than any other tasks in the reorganization of technology and the system of economic priorities which are being successfully resolved by modern science and production. It is not the difficulties of conversion which are standing on the path of disarmament, but, rather, the resistance put up by the military-industrial complex, the lack of the necessary political will on the part of the governments that bear the responsibility for the continuation of the arms race.

Naturally, the problems of the conversion of military production are viewed variously in the socialist and capitalist countries. Socialist society consists of working classes and social groups. This society has no place for those classes or social groups that would pursue selfish goals, that would strive for social privileges at the expense of others, would strive for annexation, aggression against other nations, or would view warfare as a source of their own prosperity. This was expressed very well by the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, speaking over television during a visit to West Germany in May 1978. "In our country, in the Soviet Union," L. I. Brezhnev remarked, "there are no classes, no social strata, no social groups that would have a self-interestedness in war or its preparation, that would count on using a war for their own profit. We do have, of course, military plants. We do have an army. But no one -- not the managers of those plants, not the command complement in the army, not the workers,

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not the soldiers -- none of them link their well-being with warfare, with military production orders. We would like very much -- for the tremendous advantage for society as a whole -- to switch the war plants over to the production of peacetime output, to serve peaceful creative purposes" (PRAVDA, 7 May 1978).

The posing of this problem with regard to the largest capitalist states, and primarily the United States, inevitably leads to the question of the sinister role played by the military-industrial complex, which currently has reached such a hypertrophied scope there that it is beginning, as it were, to live its own life and is threatening to become, in essence, uncontrollable. The chief difficulties in converting military production to peacetime conditions are linked there with the stubborn lack of desire on the part of the largest national and trans-national monopolies operating in that sphere to lose their source of gigantic profits, a source that is provided with governmental military orders and lavish subsidies at the expense of millions of ordinary taxpayers.

This idea was expressed very effectively by the famous American economist Professor Kenneth Bowlding in one of his statements in Congress. "The military industry," he said, "is a cancerous tumor on the body of American society. It has its own growth model. It represents a system which, practically speaking, is independent and, in fact, is objectively hostile to the welfare of the American nation, although it depicts itself as its defender" (*American Militarism 1970: A Dialogue on Distortion of our National Priorities*. New York, 1970, p 94).

Hence it evolves that a very important condition for the resolution of the problem of conversion -- as, incidentally, the entire problem of disarmament as a whole -- is the necessity of bridling the greedy strivings of the military-industrial complex. In this question also, a large and responsible role is played by all the peace-loving social forces. By the constant, persistent, and decisive efforts of political parties, parliaments, trade unions, and other mass organizations, it is necessary to strive for the reorientation of the entire socioeconomic and budgetary policy of the states. The use of the levers that already exist in the capitalist countries for exerting state influence upon the economy for the purposes of encouraging conversion is capable of facilitating that entire process, of increasing its favorable social consequences, and lessening the resistance put up by the forces that have been opposing disarmament. The system of state measures and institutions which currently is directing the growth of military production can and must be converted into a system that mobilizes the economic and scientific potential of society for the resolution of the critical problems that are confronting mankind as a whole and every nation individually. In other words, the peace-loving forces have before them today a difficult but completely attainable goal: the conversion of the military-industrial complex into a scientific-industrial complex that is oriented toward the resolution of the vitally important economic and social problems of mankind.

In this regard there also arises the question of the social danger that is represented in our day by the fact that in the United States, and in other developed capitalist countries, the gigantic production capacities intended for the production of the latest and most destructive types and systems of weapons are still concentrated, entirely or to a considerable degree, essentially in private hands, are the property of a number of the largest companies. This circumstance should not be

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ignored when analyzing the possible forms and methods of carrying out the conversion of military production.

At the same time, the extensive amount of material cited in this collection indicates that many major economists in the West, when objectively analyzing the essence of the problem, cite convincing arguments, computations, and models that attest to the reality of conversion in the capitalist countries without any major reorganization of the existing production relations.

The achievements of the human mind, the unlimited capabilities of scientific-technical progress, are currently capable of providing every nation, every family, every individual with a worthy life. But this requires eliminating once and for all the threat of war, it requires stopping the arms race and achieving real disarmament.

The cessation of the arms race would provide not only an economizing of tremendous resources for productive purposes, but also would clear the entire psychological atmosphere in the world. The spiritual life of many nations would be liberated from the pernicious influence of those forces which are living parasitically off the arms race, off the incitement of hostility and distrust among nations.

G. Lokshin, Secretary of the
Soviet Committee to Defend the
Peace

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INTERNATIONAL

BOOK EXAMINES U.S. POLICIES IN PACIFIC OCEAN REGION

Moscow SShA I PROBLEMY TIKHOGO OKEANA in Russian 1979 signed to press 1 Aug 79
pp 1-2, 326-328

[Table of contents and brief description of book edited by V.P. Lukin, I.B. Bulay,
and V.A. Kremen'yuk and published under the auspices of the USSR Academy of Sciences
Institute of the USA and Canada]

[Excerpts] Title Page:

Title: SShA I PROBLEMY TIKHOGO OKEANA (The U.S. and Problems of the Pacific
Ocean]

Publisher: Mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya

Place and year of publication: Moscow, 1979

Signed to Press Date: 1 Aug 1979

Number of Copies Published: 5000

Number of Pages: 328

Brief Description:

This book by a group of scientific workers of the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of the USA and Canada is an analysis of the problems of U.S. policy in the Pacific Ocean region in the years after the Second World War and, in particular, at the present stage. The authors examine various aspects of U.S. policy in this region and conclude that the struggle for detente must be strengthened; a system of cooperation must be set up in this region, which would answer the legitimate expectations and interests of all countries and peoples of the vast Pacific Ocean region and would conform to the standard of contemporary international relations. The book is intended for international specialists and a wide circle of readers interested in foreign policy problems.

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INTERNATIONAL

BOOK ATTACKS MAOIST IDEOLOGY, POLICIES

Moscow MAOIZM--IDEOLOGIYA I POLITIKA VOYNY in Russian 1979 signed to press 27 Aug 79 pp 1-2, 150-151

[Table of contents and brief description of book by M. Il'yin]

[Excerpts] Title Page

Title: MAOIZM--IDEOLOGIYA I POLITIKA VOYNY (Maoism--the Ideology and Policy of War)

Publisher: Mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya

Place and year of publication: Moscow, 1979

Signed to Press Date: 27 Aug 80

Number of Copies Published: 25,000

Number of Pages: 151

Brief Description:

This brochure exposes Maoism as the ideology and policy of war. It reveals the anti-socialist essence of Beijing's foreign policy, whose main course is anti-Sovietism. The work examines the great-power chauvinistic aims of the Beijing leaders, who strive to undermine the bases of peace and security of the peoples; it analyzes the lessons of China's aggression against socialist Vietnam.

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NATIONAL

MOSCOW CONFERENCE ON NATIONALITY RELATIONS

Moscow ISTORIYA SSSR in Russian No 5, 1980 pp 223-224

[M.N. Nikolayev report on Moscow scientific-practical conference: "Current Problems of the Development of the Nations and Nationality Relations"]

[Text] The conference, which was devoted to the 110th anniversary of V.I. Lenin's birth, was conducted in April 1980 by the Scientific Council for Nationality Problems attached to the USSR Academy of Sciences Presidium Social Sciences Section in conjunction with the Moscow City Seminar Council attached to the Moscow Gorkom. Scientists, leaders and students of the methodological and theoretical seminars of the House of Political Education of the Moscow Obkom and Gorkom, the methodological seminar councils attached to Moscow's Leninskiy and Cheremushkinskiy raykoms, the USSR Academy of Sciences institutes of ethnography, history of the USSR, world history, philosophy and linguistics, the Institute of Marxism-Leninism and the Academy of Social Sciences attached to the CPSU Central Committee, the Moscow State University and other scientific research institutions and VUZ's of Moscow, Leningrad, Dnepropetrovsk, Baku, Bukhara, Tartu and other cities, party workers, employees of the editorial offices of the journals NAUCHNYY KOMMUNIZM, ISTORIYA SSSR and SOVETSKAYA ETNOGRAFIYA and representatives of the Soviet Sociological Association and the USSR Philosophical Society participated in the conference.

Opening the scientific-practical conference, Academician Yu.V. Bromley, chairman of the Scientific Council for Nationality Problems and leader of the methodological seminar of the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Ethnography, described V.I. Lenin's tremendous contribution to the development of the theory and practice of the solution of the nationality question in our country, showing the permanent significance of Leninism for a fundamental reorganization of nationality relations on the basis of the principles of the friendship of the peoples and socialist internationalism.

Further, in the paper "Leninism and Nationality Processes in the Modern World" Yu. V. Bromley, pointing to the extraordinary variegation and contradictory nature of contemporary mankind's national-political structure, analyzed the main trends and regularities of its development, revealed the singularities of nationality relations in the developing countries and the essence of inter-nation and interethnic contradictions in the capitalist countries and, against the background of these contradictions, emphasized the international significance of the dialectical unity of the national and international in the development of nationality relations in the USSR, including here the prosperity and rapprochement of our country's nations and national groups and the formation of the new historical community--the Soviet people.

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Examining the complex and diverse national processes, the speaker pointed to the advisability of considering three main types of these processes: consolidation--the fusion of several culturally related genetic ethnic units into a single people; assimilation--the dissolving of individual groups or the representatives of one nationality in the environment of another (more populous, as a rule); and international integration, by which is understood processes of the interaction and rapprochement of nations and national groups which have already evolved and the creation therein of similar features in culture and way of life.

F.T. Konstantinov (USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Philosophy) devoted his paper to the correlation of the national and international in the world socialist community. I.P. Tsameryan (USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Philosophy) examined debatable questions of the national structure of the mature socialist society. The paper "The International Unity of the Soviet People and Their 'Critics'" delivered by E.A. Bagramov (Institute of Marxism-Leninism attached to the CPSU Central Committee) subjected to decisive and well-argued criticism the antipode of proletarian internationalism--bourgeois nationalism.

The propositions advanced in Yu.V. Bromley's report and also in the remaining papers were then concretized and examined on the basis of considerable factual material in the following scientific reports: "The New Historical Community in Social Progress" (I.F. Anoshkin, Institute of Marxism-Leninism attached to the CPSU Central Committee); "Certain Problems of the Strengthening of the Unity of the Soviet People" (V.M. Semenov, USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Philosophy); "Socialist Internationalism--Basis of the Unity of the Soviet Nations" (R. Rakhmanov, Bukhara Pedagogical Institute); "Basic Functions of Socialist Internationalism" (A.I. Doronchenkov, Leningrad Electrical Engineering Institute); "Certain Problems of the Scientific Control of Nationality Relations in the USSR Under the Conditions of Developed Socialism" (A.I. Kholmogorov, Dnepropetrovsk Engineering-Construction Institute); "Internationalization of Spheres of Social Life Under the Conditions of Developed Socialism" (A.P. Sertsova, Moscow State University); "Inter-Nation Communication in the USSR" (L.M. Drobizheva, USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Ethnography); "Certain Aspects of the Marxist-Leninist Concept of the Nation and the Present Day" (M.V. Iordan, USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Philosophy); "Topical Questions of National-Language Development in the USSR at the Stage of Socialist Building" (M.I. Isayev, USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Linguistics); "Development Trends of Bilingualism Under the Conditions of Developed Socialism" (M.N. Guboglo, USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Ethnography); "The Role of Russian in the Development of the Soviet People" (A.A. Basalay, USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Sociological Studies); "A Class Approach to Social Phenomena--A Most Important Principle of Internationalist Education" (M.Kh. Karimov, Bukhara Pedagogical Institute); "Unity of Patriotic and International Education" (V.S. Zaika, USSR Academy of Pedagogical Sciences Scientific Research Institute of General Problems of Education); "An Increase in Soviet People's Political Culture as an Important Factor in the Fight Against Vestiges of Nationalism" (R. Safayeva, USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Philosophy); and "The Significance of Lenin's Ideas for the Development of the Pan-Soviet Features of the Culture of the USSR Peoples" (G. Ye. Trapeznikov, USSR Institute of History of the USSR Academy of Sciences).

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Collating the results of the conference's work, A.M. Grigor'yev, chairman of the Moscow City Methodological Seminar Council Social Sciences Section, said that the conference had been an interesting and meaningful event in the series of measures devoted to the 110th anniversary of V.I. Lenin's birth. The material of this conference is not only of scientific-theoretical significance but will indisputably afford students of the methodological and theoretical seminars in the political education system important practical assistance.

In his closing remarks F.T. Konstantinov noted as a positive feature of the conference's work the meaningful exchange of opinions on a number of key and debatable issues of the nationality problem. He pointed to the need sounded in a number of speeches for a comprehensive approach to an investigation of nationality relations.

The conferees adopted the decision to formulate concrete recommendations whose implementation would make it possible to reflect nationality problems, international aspects of the CPSU's nationality policy, criticism of bourgeois falsifications of the Soviet experience of the solution of the nationality question and the national and international in the modern world more fully and in greater depth in the work of the methodological and theoretical seminars.

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TURKMEN CRITIC CONDEMNS 'ABSTRACTNESS' IN HISTORICAL NOVEL

Ashkhabad SOVET ADEBIYATY in Turkmen No 8, Aug 80 pp 100-123

[Article by Saylav Myradov: "Historical Truth and the Writer's Imagination"]

[Summary] "In this article we intend to touch upon the question of how historical truth and the writer's imagination work in novels and short stories on the historical revolutionary theme in the literatures of the peoples of Central Asia and Kazakhstan," specifically, "in the works of some historians and writers mistakes and contradictions have been made in depicting the events of 1916 in their work." Examples in the works of two historians--in G. Nepesov's "The Victory of Soviet Organization in North Turkmenistan (1917-1936)" and A. Sadykov's "From the History of the Khorezm Revolution" and "Russia and Khiva in the Second Half of the Nineteenth Century and the Beginning of the XXth Century"--they have made several errors in the depiction of Juneyd Khan and in analyzing the role of the people who, in fact, "struggled so that their human qualities would not be trampled upon and to improve their lot." To evaluate the uprising in 1916 in Khorezm objectively one must bear in mind that the "working class was generally insignificant" and the "political conceptions of the peasants were extremely poor.... There was no progressive political party able to evaluate the event politically and which knew how to direct the aspirations of the peasants.... Both German imperialism and the Turkish sultanate took advantage of this."

Writers are also guilty of this lack of sensitivity to the mechanism of the exact events of the time. "Turkmen and Uzbek writers have not depicted the...subjects, images and social questions in all their complexity, multi-faceted natures, and with all the colorations" involved with any analysis of 1916. Even in B. Seytakov's epic work he "does not pay special attention to the difficulties in 1916...", nor does the Uzbek writer Jumannyaz Sheripov.

Another problem for the writer is adherence to historical fact. "When the writer treats a contemporary theme he may exploit his imagination to a considerable degree, but when he writes on a historical theme his freedom is somewhat more limited. He cannot change significant historical events by whim." In short, there is not one truth for writers and another for historians. While Seytakov and Sheripov have not followed this rule, "they were familiar with some of the difficulties and complexities of real life" and the "social significance of their heroes is sharpened." Despite the obstacles involved with treating the historical facts of this period, "one has to depict" the events of the time.

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In the realm of the history of Turkmen Soviet literature Kerbabayev's story "Famine" deals with a composite hero "created in his imagination on the basis of dozens of types...." Where flaws appear to exist, such as in some of the works of S. Ayni, S. Seyfullin, Y. Jansugirov and S. Mukan, "they did not consider them to be history, they considered them to be contemporary works written in their own time. In the years when those works were written they would have been unable to talk about the basic facts on the diversionary plans of international imperialism or the influence of the October revolution on neighboring countries." Every writer, of course, has a choice in using "documentary 'sources'." Many authors use documents equally with their creative imaginations.

The Kazakh writer Sabyt Muanov, for example, created a prototype of the revolutionary Askar Dosanov by changing the name of his fictional hero; this way "great freedom was given to his imagination in order to typify his heroes."

The historical-revolutionary theme has been treated in the literature of every people, but treating this subject in all its complexity by Kazakh, Uzbek, Turkmen, Tajik and Kirghiz literatures independently is not as satisfactory as if it would be treated as a theme of the "regional literature of Central Asia and Kazakhstan."

A number of writers, such as Kerbabayev and Seytakov, have created personages of the time who are, in essence, "prototypes" of real historical figures. For this, mastery of the historical sources and documents is essential. When this mastery is not there and the author inserts an historical figure, as in Seytakov's tale "Poet" based on the life of Durdy Gylych, any violation of the facts results in confusion for the reader; in the case of Gylych, the chronology of his life is confused and run together, leading to mistaken perceptions of his artistic development. "Artistic literature must depict history in all its complexity...." Superficiality in this regard can result in misinterpretation, as in Kerbabayev's story "Decisive Step": in talking about the "pan-Turanist" Turkish Captain Kazim Beg, he says: "...Kazim Beg attempted to bring the Muslims of Turkestan under the name of Islam and to sow the seeds of pan-Turkism in Turkestan; as a result, to create a Muslim state dependent on Turkey.... At the same time, English intelligence...stirred up the clergy against the Soviet Government in Turkestan.... In this agitation, Kazim Beg aided British intelligence." Myradov notes that "these words of the writer deviate from historical truth. Kazim Beg was not on the side of the English in Turkestan. On the contrary, he worked against them, "as noted by the historian Sh. Tashliyev in his 'Grazhdanskaya voyna i angliiskaya voennaya interventsia v Turkmenistane'." In depicting Kazim Beg, Kerbabayev worked from an "abstract" position instead of dealing with him from the point of view "of his basic drives, individual characteristics and aspirations"; as a result, "historical truth about Kazim Beg has been...distorted." Furthermore, "taken in the broadest context, the historical personage Kazim Beg rises above the work which he wanted to do and did.... At a concrete historical opportunity he is only superficially, one-sidedly and very vaguely explained by the tense, turbulent situations executed by Turkey."

Many of the representatives of the older intelligentsia were swayed one way or the other by the events of the time but "these representatives, thinking about the future of the people, ultimately did great work for Soviet culture. In this question the Communist Party and the Soviet Government played a major role." Among those to whom this pertains were S. Ayni and M. Awazov. One of the major characteristics of artists like Sadrettin Ayni, Saken Seyfullin, Oraz Tachnazarov and

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Mukhtar Awazov was the combination of an artistic and an official life; "they were not limited by merely depicting a changing life, they also exerted all their energies to changing it."

Finally, when it comes to handling touchy historical events, "neither the historians nor the writers have the right to treat them abstractly; those times must be studied in detail and must be depicted in a concrete manner in artistic literature." If one writes an historical novel, it must be based on historical truth as far as it is known.

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